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Rights, Legitimate Expectations, Needs
and Responsibilities:
UNHCR and the New World Order
GEOFF GILBERT*
'Other maps are such shapes, with their islands and capes!
But we've got our brave Captain to thank'
(So the crew would protest) 'that he's bought us the best —
A perfect and absolute blank.'
Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark, Fit the Second, fourth stanza, at p. 56 in The
Annotated Snark (ed. Martin Gardner, 1962).
Abstract
This paper starts from the premise that despite the enlarged role that UNHCR has taken
on, particularly since 1989, it is still governed by its original 1950 mandate to provide
international protection to refugees, as defined. This extended work has led it to deal
with non-refugees, even those who are not even internally displaced, and to carrying out
tasks beyond those originally envisaged. Furthermore, its legal personality in international
law has increased with its functions, and it is pointless to suggest that UNHCR should
return to its original role. Thus, the aim of the paper is to examine what rights UNHCR
already possesses which are pertinent to its new-found tasks and what rights it needs vis-
d-vis various actors. In some cases, it is difficult to conceive of the need in terms of a
right, and in those cases the object was to highlight a legitimate expectation. If UNHCR
has this expanded role, however, the question arises as to its responsibilities in international
law. Responsibility has two facets: responsibility for what and to whom. Both aspects are
examined, acknowledging that as things stand UNHCR is not sufficiendy accountable.
The additional difficulty, though, is that in many situations there is multi-agency activity,
making it hard to attribute responsibility to any one actor. The conclusion is diat these
rights and responsibilities need to be codified in some international convention which it
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is open to UNHCR, and other IGOs possibly, to join. While mere paper rights are of
no direct, practical consequence, the fact that UNHCR workers can at least assert them
in their dealings with State officials when they are being denied and that a modern
clarification of die mandate will be established, has to be of benefit.
1. Introduction
To paraphrase Mark Twain, news of the demise of the Westphalian
State, and its concomitant sovereign status, has been much exaggerated.
While the certainties of the bipolar world of East-West confrontation
have passed, there has been little evidence of States renouncing their
sovereignty. Rather, alongside an increased number of States, one now
has to cope with interdependent associations of States and simultaneous
demands for autonomy by ethnic groups1 within States.2 Furthermore,
armed conflicts are rarely inter-State any more, but are internal, often
with more than two parties thereto and with a loose chain of command
between what passes for the army's headquarters and those fighting on
the ground. Conflicts are fragmented.3 And into all this uncertainty, the
United Nations and its agencies have, in part, been thrust and have, in
part, strode out The reduction in superpower confrontation within the
Security Council has meant that the United Nations has deployed or has
authorized the deployment of forces to 'solve' humanitarian crises.4 Along
with the military forces, the humanitarian agencies have had to cope
with a 'new world disorder', where they face demands by those they have
been sent to assist and by the international community to solve the
insoluble as if it were some mathematical puzzle.
Given the increased role in crises of humanitarian agencies, in particular
UNHCR, do they need additional rights and powers to fulfil the
expectations placed upon them?5 Further, if they have these greater
rights and this increased role, should they assume a greater degree of
responsibility in international law, or should responsibility remain with
1
 A.D. Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Slates, (1986); sec generally, E. Gellner, Motions and Nationalism,
(1983), esp. at 53ff. Also Smith, 'Nations and their Pasts'; Gellner, 'Do Nations have Navels?'; and
Smith, "Memory and Modernity: Reflections on Ernest Gellner's Theory of Nationalism', 2 Nations
& Nationalism 358-88 (1996).
2
 See T. Franck, 'Clan and Superdan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice',
90 AJIL 359, 360 (1996); N. MacCormick, 'Beyond the Sovereign State', 56 MLR 1 (1993).
See K. Landgren, 'Safety Zonea and International Protection: A Dark Grey Area', 7 1JRL 436,
437 (1995).
4
 FJ. Hampson, 'States' Military Operations Authorized by the United Nations and International
Humanitarian Law', in L. Condorelli (ed), The United Nations and Humanitarian Law, (1996), 371; H.
McCoubrey and N. White, The BUu Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations (1996).
The political quettion of whether UNHCR should be expanding its role is not addressed in this
paper except in so far as its role calls into question its obligations under its Statute; see further
below, note 28. In times of general financial constraint, however, it is sensible to focus on one's core
obligation which, in the case of UNHCR, is protection. See also, W. Clarence, 'Field Strategy for
the Protection of Human Rights', 9 IJRL 229 (1997).
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States? This latter question is complicated, however, by the fact that
States often seek to restrict their obligations to displaced persons and
may be imposing extra burdens on UNHCR in order to avoid their own
duties. Moreover, where a State mistreats refugees,6 UNHCR is criticized
for not preventing it, rarner than the State being acknowledged as
responsible under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.7
UNHCR can protest, usually privately, but its only other option would
be to withdraw, leaving the refugees with no independent voice. At the
same time, UNHCR has also adopted a more active and self-directed
role as regards certain crises. In sum, the background picture is less than
clearly defined.8
This article examines the rights, existing, required or desired, of
UNHCR and the responsibilities it ought to assume in humanitarian
crises:9 those responsibilities may be legal or they may merely reflect
issues of good governance. The hope is to provide a framework for the
better analysis of die international law relating to the work of agencies,
particularly UNHCR, which protect displaced persons during
humanitarian crises.
2. The End of Bipolarism
Although the strictly bipolar view of die world was already somewhat
simplistic by the end of the 1980s, any analysis of present-day conflicts
as aspects of a wider superpower confrontation would be unsubstantiated
in fact.10 For refugees, die end of bipolarism has led to a decrease in their
strategic and political value to States who had previously been eager to
use their 'persecution' as justification for the confrontation." As a result
of the end of bipolarism, die United Nations has had an increased role
in humanitarian crises in terms of peacekeeping and peace-making, and
6
 See Kenya's actions, reported in the Guardian, 31 Jul. 1997, 9.
7
 189 IWTSbO. And see the 1967 Protocol, 606 6W77 267.
8
 See N. Morris, 'Protection Dilemmas and UNHCR's Response: A Personal View from Within
UNHCR', 9 IJRL 492, 492, 496-7 (1997).
It may be possible to transfer the principles of this analysis to other IGOs and some NGOs;
however, while they face similar problems to UNHCR, they present a very different framework of
analysis. The other major actor in humanitarian crises, the Internationa] Committee of the Red
Cross, may possess international legal personality through its activities, but is in fact a private Swiss
non-governmental organization; see J-P. Lavoyer, 'Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons:
International Humanitarian Law and the Role of the ICRC, 305 IRRC 162, 167 (1995).
For a view of the strategic nature of refugee movements, see G. Loescher, Refiiget MovarujUs and
International Secmily, Addphi Paper No.268, 1992, 28ff; and A. Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War,
Adelphi Paper No.305, 1996, 12-14.
" See UNHCR, WfHCR Straltg, Towards 2000 (1996), at para.18. See also, G.W. Hymans,
'Oudawing the Use of Refugees as Tools of Foreign Policy', 3 ILSAJ. Infl & Comp.L 149 (1996).
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has had to take on more onerous responsibilities toward those caught up
in the conflict.12
In the 1990s the Security Council has not merely found itself able to do things
which it could not previously do. It has found itself expected to do somediing
about conflicts of a type outside the United Nations' previous experience. While
the United Nations cannot do everything, the United Nations is particularly
well-placed to take action in the name of the international community. It is not
inappropriate in principle for die United Nations to be involved in enforcement
action and peace-enforcement operations.13
A clear example is the establishment of a safe haven in Northern Iraq
for the Kurdish population in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991.14
At the time of their establishment, before Iraq's agreement to the presence
of United Nations Guards,15 it is arguable that Northern Iraq was occupied
territory, an occupation justified under, the UN Charter. Other inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs) have equally adopted a more
interventionist stance. While the Dayton Agreement affirms UNHCR's
lead role in the humanitarian relief in Bosnia-Herzegovina, bom die
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the European
Union have administrative functions which incline towards them fulfilling
tasks within Bosnian society normally associated with sovereign
governments. The European Union, for example, which is not even
explicitly stated to have international legal personality in the Treaty of
Maastricht, is responsible for the City of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
evidencing through practice what is not express in the treaty.'6
If there is increased interventionism within States, how far are IGOs,
and in particular the United Nations, responsible in international and
domestic law for dieir actions and those of persons working for them?
" See Loescher, Refugee Movements, 52-3; Roberts, Humanitarian Action, 10-18. See also, A.
Roberts, 'The Laws of War Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts', in European
Commission, Law in Humanitarian Crises, vol. I, 13-82 (1995).
" Hampson, 'States' Military Operations', 425.
14
 H. Cook, 77u Safe Haven m Northern Iraq, 1995.
15
 Sec UNSC res. 688 (1991), 30 ILM 858 (1991), in which the Security Council '3. Insists that
Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of
assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operation . . . '
and '5. Requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal, including
those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgendy the critical needs of the refugees
and displaced Iraqi population.' The United Nations Guard was agreed to by Iraq in a Memorandum
of Understanding of May 25 1991: UN doc. S/22663, 30 ILM 860 (1991). See Cook, The Safe Haven
m Northern Iraq, 56ff. UNHCR's presence in Northern Iraq was covered by a Memorandum of
Understanding of 18 Apr. 1991 between Iraq and the Secretary-General's Executive Delegate and
a request by Iraq on April 23 that the United Nations should take over the Centres being established
by die Allies' Combined Task Force Provide Comfort (I am grateful to Nicholas Morris of UNHCR
for this information).
16
 Cf. Reparations Cast, below, note 17. D. McGoldrick, International Relations Law of the Eiavpean
Union, 1997. The Dublin proposals of 5 Dec 1996 recommend in Ch. 13 that the European Union
be accorded international legal personality, see also, European Report, No.2210, 26 Mar. 1997, 2ff.
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The United Nations is not a State, so the law pertaining to State
responsibility is not immediately applicable. Nevertheless, the United
Nations, at least, has international legal personality. In the Reparations
Case,11 the International Court of Justice (ICJ), acknowledging the role
the United Nations was intended to fulfil according to its founders, with
its attendant duties and responsibilities, held that the attribution of
international personality in large measure was indispensable. Whilst the
United Nations was not a State, 'it is a subject of international law and
capable of possessing international rights and duties . . . ' That it could be
liable in domestic law was recognized by the 1946 Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.18 These privileges and
immunities, though, can be waived.19 In addition, there is a question as
to how far the United Nations, and other IGOs, can be responsible in
international law. like States, responsibility should only be civil, not
criminal.20 However, a contrast has to be drawn between the position of
IGOs in humanitarian crises and any troops sent as peacekeepers or
peacemakers. The latter remain national contingents, bound by the law
of armed conflict in so far as it applies,21 with the sending State responsible
for any violation.22 Workers for IGOs, on the other hand, do not incur
the liability of their country of nationality for acts committed on behalf
of die IGO. To that extent, there is greater need to look at the responsibility
of IGOs.
1
 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Senna of the Untied Nations Case, Advisory Opinion, [1949] ICJ
Rep. 178-9.
UKTS 10(1950), Cmd 6753; see N.S. Rodley, 'Immunities of Officials Associated with Permanent
United Nations Establishments', 26 Tb. World Aff. 314 (1972).
19
 Standard Chartered Bank v International Tm Counal [1986] 3 All ER 257.
20
 See the International Law Commission's Draft Code on State Responsibility, art. 19 of which
describes some breaches of international law by States in terms of international crimes. Part I of the
Draft Code can be found in [1980] Yb.ILC, vol II (Pt 2), 3CM-. For a critical view of the criminalization
of State Responsibility see, L.C. Green, 'New Trends in International Criminal Law", 11 Israeli
Tb.HJl 9, 24-40 (1981); K. Marek, 'Criminalizing State Responsibility1, 14 R.BDJ. 460 (1978-79)
and G. Gilbert, 'The Criminal Responsibility of States', 39 ICLQJiAb (1990); R. Rosenstock, 'Current
Developments: T h e Forty-Seventh Session of the International Law Commission', 90 AJIL 106
(1996), and V. Morris and M-C. Bourloyannis-Vrailas, 'Current Developments: T h e Work of the
Sixth Committee at the Fiftieth Session of the U N General Assembly', 90 AJIL 491 (1996).
21
 See Hampson, 'States' Military Operations ' , and McCoubrey and White, Blue Helmets.
22
 See C a n a d a ' s exper i ence of violations commi t t ed by its t roops in Somal i a {Guardian, 5 Apr .
1993, 8; 17Jan. 1997, 15; 3Jul. 1997, 21) and in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Guardian, 18Jan. 1997, 12);
also in the case of Somalia, with regard to Belgian forces (Guardian, 12 Apr. 1997, 21; 23Jun. 1997,
14; 1 Jul. 1997, 12) and Italian forces (Guardian, 7 Jun. 1997, 18; 25 June 1997, 15; 28 May 1998,
7: international edition). Somali faction leaders have claimed that they should receive damages from
the UN for the behaviour of these troops: Guardian, 12Jul. 1997, 14; Alex de Waal, 'A Brutal Peace",
Editorial, Guardian, 30 OcL 1997, 21.
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3. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees23
People working for UNHCR are, for the most part, accorded functional
immunity. The Office of the High Commissioner is an integral part of
the United Nations and thus within the 1946 Convention on Privileges
and Immunities.24 In articles VII and following of the UNHCR's Model
Co-operation Agreement with Governments (Model Agreement),
UNHCR, its officials and experts on mission are to benefit from the
relevant provisions of the 1946 Convention and 'such additional privileges
and immunities as may be necessary for the effective exercise of the
international protection and humanitarian assistance functions of
UNHCR.'25
Thus, die starting point must be that ordinarily UNHCR and its staff
will not be liable in domestic law for any wrongdoing associated with
carrying out their jobs, although article XV allows the Secretary-General
of die United Nations to waive mat immunity widi respect to personnel
where it would odierwise 'impede die course of justice and it can be
waived widiout prejudice to die interests of die United Nations and
UNHCR.'26 The privileges and immunities of UNHCR itself cannot be
waived under the Model Agreement,27 although article XVI deals with
the settlement of disputes between UNHCR and the host government.
That, however, summarizes the traditional, solely domestic position,
whereas it is the contention of this paper that given the increased role
for UNHCR during die 1990s, it is necessary to reconsider the rights
required and the responsibilities to be assumed by UNHCR in a wider
context.
U N H C R has been chosen because of (he leading role placed upon it by States and the United
Nat ions in humani ta r i an crises.
24
 Above, note 18.
25
 Additionally, Article X states that the UNHCR Representative and Deputy Representative
and other senior officials shall be treated in the same manner as diplomatic envoys and enjoy full
diplomatic immunity; see 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961: 500 UNTS95.
26
 The fact that immunity stems from the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations and waiver ihould not prejudice the interests of the United Nations as well as
UNHCR that leads to this function being given to the Secretary-General rather than the High
Commissioner. This does not mean that UNHCR has no separate personality from that of the
Secretariat of the United Nations; see Article XVI — where UNHCR and the host government
have a dispute and cannot agree on an arbitrator, they seek the services of the President of the ICJ
to resolve the problem, not the Secretary-General.
27
 A l t h o u g h U N H C R c o u l d waive it in p rac t i ce ; see Standard Chartered Bank u ITC, a b o v e , n o t e 19,
at 262-3.
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3.1 TheRoleofUNHCR
The role of UNHCR is laid down in its Statute, 'providing international
protection to refugees',28 and in the Convention and Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees.29 Nevertheless, the role has developed to fit the
times and has been added to by the General Assembly and the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC). UNHCR is also advised by the Executive
Committee of the UNHCR Programme.30
UNHCR's primary purpose is to protect the safety and welfare of people who
have been uprooted or threatened by persecution, armed conflict and human
rights violations. In its efforts to fulfil that objective, the organization seeks lasting
solutions to the plight of refugees and other displaced people, primarily by means
of voluntary repatriation and reintegration, and strives to mitigate the problems
confronting those countries and communities affected by forced population
displacements. By supporting national and international initiatives to ameliorate
conditions in countries of origin, thereby enhancing the security of people who
might feel compelled to seek safety elsewhere, UNHCR is increasingly engaged
in the effort to avert refugee movements and other forced displacements . . .
Since the late 1980s . . . a growing proportion of UNHCR's activities has taken
place within countries of origin, both in zones of active conflict, and in the
context of multidimensional peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict resolution
operations.31
From being responsible only for protection under the Statute and for
ensuring that member States honour dieir obligation under article 33 not
to refoule persons falling within the strict definition found in article 1 of
die 1951 Convention, UNHCR's role has expanded incrementally and
exponentially to cover victims of war and human rights violations, as well
as persons who have not managed to cross an international frontier and
even to assisting in stabilization in potential source States.32 The High
Commissioner herself has recognized tiiis33 and has noted the problems
to which it gives rise.
28
 U N G A ra.428(V) Annex, U N G A O R Supp. (No.20) 46, U N d o c A / 1 7 7 5 , 14 Dec. 1950,
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; see in particular paras.
1—3, 9 and 11. T h e General Assembly has since adopted further resolutions defining the High
Commissioner's role; see H C R / I N F / 4 8 / R c v . 2 .
29
 Above, note 7. T h e U N H C R has the duty of ' supervis ing the application of the provisions' by
States of the Convent ion and Protocol: art . 35 C S R 5 1 , art. II (1) C S R P 6 7 .
30
 Current ly there are fifty-three States on the U N H C R Executive Commit tee ( E X C O M ) ,
including the five p e r manen t members of the Security Counci l . E X C O M Conclusions might reflect
customary international law, but on their own, like Genera l Assembly resolutions, they have no
binding force in international law and are solely recommendatory . Moreover , whereas one can use
General Assembly resolutions as evidence of custom, in par t because nearly all States arc members
of the Uni ted Nations, almost three-quarters of U N M e m b e r States are not on E X C O M ; E X C O M
Conclusions are akin to General Assembly Resolutions, only weaker.
51
 ' U N H C R 2000 ' , above, note 11, a t paras. 1 a n d 5.
12
 See also, ' U N H C R 2000' , above, note 11, paras . 32, 3 3 .
53
 See the speech of Sadako Oga ta , 'World O r d e r , Internal Conflict a n d Refugees', J o h n F .
Kennedy School of Government , Harva rd University, 28 Oct . 1996, 1-2.
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[In-State activities raise] . . . difficult questions as [they touch] upon national
sovereignty. Consent of the State concerned is an essential condition for UNHCR
to exercise its protection function toward internally displaced persons. In many
instances, however, there is no functioning government to grant consent as die
country may de facto be governed by competing military and political factions.34
UNHCR is to be non-political and is to act in the humanitarian
interest,35 yet this neutrality is challenged when the more interventionist
stance of the United Nations leads to it being perceived as favouring
one side or the other.36
3.1.1 The Scope of UMiCRi Mandate
UNHCR is a subsidiary organ established by the General Assembly under
article 22 of the United Nations Charter.37 The scope of its mandate is
to be found in its Statute.38 However, the Statute refers to the High
Commissioner following policy directives from the General Assembly and
ECOSOC and that the General Assembly may determine that the High
Commissioner shall engage in additional activities, subject to resource
limitations.39 UNHCR also considers the advice of the Executive
Committee.40 There is, however, no reference to the role of the Security
Council and the Statute only refers to the Secretary-General in Chapter
III Organization and Finances, where paragraph 17 provides that 'The
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General shall make appropriate
arrangements for liaison and consultation on matters of mutual interest.'
The constitutional position of UNHCR within the United Nations
system reflects its role. Under paragraph 2 of its Statute, the High
Commissioner's work is to be non-political, humanitarian and social. To
avoid the politicization associated with the United Nations Secretariat,41
die High Commissioner is to be nominated by the Secretary-General,
but is elected by the General Assembly.42 The High Commissioner should
follow die policy directives of the General Assembly and ECOSOC and
reports annually to the General Assembly.43 Thus, taking directions from
the Secretary-General to the exclusion of the General Assembly might
amount to a partial breach of mandate.44 Nevertheless, despite the attempt
54
 Above, note 33, 2.
35
 UNHCR Statute, above, note 28, para. 2.
16
 See Landgren, 'Safety Zones', 457-8; and Roberts, 'Humanitarian Action', esp. 29—35, 51-6
and 82-4.
37
 See UNGA res. 319 A (TV), 3 Dec 1949.
38
 Above, note 28.
39
 Statute, above, note 28, paras. 3, 9.
40
 In 1996, the Executive Committee delegated some of its authority to a Standing Committee.
41
 See G.S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in Intanatwtud Law, 2nd ed. 1996, 214ff, esp. note 43.
45
 Statute, above, note 28, para. 13.
45
 Above, note 28, paras. 3 and 11, respectively.
44
 The Secretary-General has been able to inmtt the High Commissioner to participate in United
Nations humanitarian efforts since 1972 (UNGA res. 2956 (XXVIi), para. 2, (12 Dec 1972). I am
grateful to Jean-Nicolas Beuzc, LLM student 1996-97, for discussions on this point
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to separate and distance the work of the High Commissioner from the
political decisions of the Secretary-General, one recent event suggests
that the Secretary-General does not always fully accord the High
Commissioner her intended independent standing: Boutros Boutros-Ghali
ordered UNHCR to resume humanitarian assistance in the former
Yugoslavia after Sadako Ogata had withdrawn it in protest.45 This event
suggests that the High Commissioner may not be solely answerable to
the General Assembly, despite the Statute.46 As for the Security Council,
it could give directions to a State which would also require the High
Commissioner to act so as to assist in the maintenance or restoration of
international peace and security.47 However, in that case, any violation
of mandate in response to a Chapter VII resolution would presumably
be unchallengeable following the ICJ's decision in the Lockerbie case.48
Whereas the Statute gives the General Assembly power to extend the
range of the High Commissioner's activities, that power, since it is within
the Statute, must be exercised so as not to violate the Statutory mandate.
Of course, there is nothing to stop the General Assembly from drafting
a new Statute, and the present confusion comes from incremental additions
to UNHCR's role and the question whether they represent a new general
mandate or whether they are ad hoc. Even more so than the General
Assembly, the Secretary-General, to the extent that any instruction to
the High Commissioner to act is constitutional, must also instruct in
conformity with the Statute and accepted General Assembly extensions.
The Security Council, on the other hand, could, in theory under a
Chapter VII direction to members of the United Nations,49 indirectly
45
 Guardian, 18 F e b . 1993, 8; 19 Feb . 1993, 10; 20 F e b . 1993, 1; 22 Feb . 1993, 8.
46
 The proper response is evidenced by the practice of the present incumbent Kofi Annan, in
consultation with the High Commissioner, condemned the then rebel forces in the 1997 Zairean
civil war for denying UNHCR and other relief organizations access to refugees from Rwanda who
were meant to be considered for repatriation, achieving access for UNHCR once more: Guardian,
26 Apr. 1997, 14; 29 Apr. 1997, 8; 15 May 1997, 17.
47
 UNHCR has been given functions by the Security Council in response to humanitarian crises
in many resolutions in recent years; see, for example, UNSC res.787 (1992), 16 Nov. 1992, in which
para. 19 called on the Secretary-General and High Commissioner to promote 'safe areas for
humanitarian purposes'; to mat extent, it is recognized that displacement can be a threat to
international peace and security. So far, every extension of UNHCR's role by the Security Council,
and for that matter the Secretary-General, has been with prior consent of the High Commissioner
(again, I am indebted to Nicholas Morris for his comments on an earlier draft). That still leaves
open whether a Chapter VII Resolution is binding on non-State actors under arts. 41 and 42 of die
Charter, but the ICJ's decision in the Lockerbie case, (below, note 48), indicates the subservience to
the Security Counci] of United Nations institutions, at least.
48
 Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Libyan Arab Jamahmjpa v United Kingdom and the USA, [1992] ICJ R e p . , 3 ,
paras. 39ff: 31 ILM 662 (1992); F. Beveridge, The Lockerbie Affair', 41 /CLQ.907, 916-19 (1992).
Cf. J-E. Alvarez, 'Judging the Security Council', 90 AJLL 1 (1996). A resolution under Chapter VI
would not necessarily be unchallengeable.
49
 UNSC res.941 (1994), 23 Sept 1994, para. 5, called on the Bosnian Serbs, who are not a
member State of the United Nations, to give unimpeded access to UNHCR to Banja Luka, Bijeljina
and odier areas of concern.
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require UNHCR not only to act beyond its mandate, but contrary to it
if that was necessary to restore international peace and security.50
Parallel to its mandate, one must also have regard to UNHCR's legal
personality in international law, its functional capacity.51 Given that
UNHCR is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, it has only that
degree of personality conferred by the latter organ of the United Nations.
Under paragraph 8 of the Statute,52 it is assumed that UNHCR will have
independent legal personality on the international plane, for,
[the] High Commissioner shall provide for the protection of refugees falling
under the competence of his Office by:
(a) Promoting the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for
the protection of refugees, supervising their application and proposing amendments
thereto, (emphasis added)
hi article 35 of the 1951 Convention,53 States have agreed that diey will
facilitate UNHCR's supervision of the application of the Convention's
provisions. In bodi instances, UNHCR is treated as being able to function
vis-a-vis States in a general supervisory capacity widi regard to refugees.
Following the Reparations Case,*4 die particular international rights and
duties of UNHCR, 'depend upon its purposes and functions as specified
or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.'
In dieory, UNHCR cannot act beyond its statutory remit, aldiough
diat provides for the General Assembly determining additional activities
'widiin the limits of the resources placed at [the High Commissioner's]
disposal'. However, Shearer has noted that the ICJ went on to establish
a doctrine of inherent powers,55 diose functions 'conferred upon [die
international institution] by necessary implication as being essential to
die performance of its duties'.56 One example is UNHCR's management
of camps, not referred to in the Statute, but essential to its work of
providing protection to groups of refugees.57
To whom dien, does the mandate extend?58 The Statute refers solely
to refugees. They are defined in paragraphs 6 and 7. While paragraph
50
 W h a t if the Security Counci l decided that refugee camps in State A were a threat to international
peace and security because of their destabilizing influence a n d ordered State B, the source State, to
readmi t its popula t ion forthwith, requiring U N H C R to assist in the transfer, even though no status
determinat ion had taken place of persons in die c a m p and there was no guarantee that any
repatr iat ion would be voluntary?
51
 Personality, here , is confined to issues of functionality and no at tempt is m a d e to examine the
issue in the abstract in international law.
52
 Above, note 28.
53
 Above, note 7.
M
 Above, note 17, at 180.
55
 I A Shearer, Stariei Intematiaial Law, 1 lth ed, 1994, 548.
56
 Reparations Cast, a b o v e , n o t e 17, a t 182.
57
 The Statute, above, note 28, paras. 1 and 2.
M
 See also G.S. Goodwin-Gill, "Who to Protect, How, . . . and die Future', Editorial, 9 IJRL 1
(1997).
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6.A mirrors the original, restrictive definition of the 1951 Convention
before it was expanded by the 1967 Protocol,59 especially with respect to
the temporal limitation, paragraph 6.B is not restricted, either temporally
or geographically. Thus, even if in ratifying the 1951 Convention the
State limited the refugees whom it would not refoule to those whose well-
founded fear was as a result of'events occurring in Europe before 1 January
1951*,60 such a State could not deny that UNHCR has responsibility under
its Statute to provide international protection to refugees resulting from
events outside those parameters.6 The protection may be illusory,
however, for the State can refuse these refugees entry62 or deport them,
subject only to custom63 and any alternative human rights obligations
that might be pertinent,64 for its reservation means it does not recognize
their status. Furthermore, the resolutions of the General Assembly are
not legally binding unless they encapsulate customary international law,
to the development of which they can also contribute. It is possible to
imagine that a State could consistently object to paragraph 6.B during
the debates on the High Commissioner's mandate so as to evidence its
non-acceptance of this wider customary definition of a refugee to whom
UNHCR owes international protection.
Finally, whereas the 1951 definition, found also in paragraph 6 of the
Statute, has been interpreted highly individualistically, the Statute provides
in paragraph 2 that the work of UNHCR 'shall relate, as a rule, to groups
and categories of refugees'. When deciding on non-refoulement, it is natural
that individual decisions are necessary, but during a humanitarian crisis
international protection will be offered to the group.
This leads to another part of UNHCR's work, namely, in refugee
camps. As part of receiving influxes of persons fleeing from persecution
across an international border, UNHCR has, almost since its inception,
provided protection in refugee camps in receiving States. The increase
in numbers in those camps, however, has left UNHCR, not necessarily
M
 Above, note 7. The Statute does not include 'membership of a particular social group' among
the grounds for persecution, that head having been added to the 1951 Convention only at the final
stages of the drafting process. Nevertheless, para.2 of the Statute does state that the work of the
High Commissioner 'shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees'.
At 30June 1998, only Congo, Madagascar, Monaco, Hungary, Malta and Turkey limit refugees
to those arising as a result of events in Europe. Madagascar and Monaco have not yet adhered to
die 1967 Protocol, so the temporal limitation is also extant in dieir case.
' The Statute is renewed for five year periods. Thus, the General Assembly reaffirm their
commitments in paragraph 6.B. The mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner was renewed
for a further five years from 1 Jan. 1994: UNGA res.47/104, 16 Dec. 1992. The Third Committee
adopted by acclamation in Nov. 1997 a resolution sponsored by 132 delegations to extend UNHCR
to 2003; it was adopted by the General Assembly in Dec 1997.
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 See the actions of Turkey following the Gulf War of 1991 ns-a-vis Iraqi Kurds; Cook, The Safe
Haan in Northern Iraq, 36.
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 See Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 167-71.
See, for example, Chahal v United Kingdom, below, note 156.
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willingly or happily, with responsibility to co-ordinate a worldwide mini-
empire with a population numbered in the millions.65 The Model
Agreement talks of UNHCR consulting and co-operating with the host
State, indicating that UNHCR is providing protection while the State
remains responsible, de jure, for the people in those camps; in practice,
UNHCR might co-ordinate assistance, but the day-to-day running of the
camp will be in the hands of local authorities and/or NGOs distributing
the relief. On the other hand, in effect, the land on which the camps lie
has almost been 'leased' from the State which is no longer in de facto
control of that area; international law, which maintains that the State is
responsible for what happens on its territory, ignores the effective power
of IGOs, which are die only bodies capable of providing for the large
scale influxes of displaced persons during some humanitarian crises.
This leaves some questions unresolved. Unless die Security Council
has ordained the existence of die camps under Chapter VII, then die
differing obligations of die State under die 1951 Convention and UNHCR
under its Statute are once again apparent: the State is under no duty to
allow die establishment of die camp, odier than diat it might be the sole
means of housing persons who have crossed die border before dieir
refugee status can be determined;66 UNHCR, on die odier hand, has die
wider obligation of providing international protection and die camp may
be die best means, temporarily, of achieving diat end. Nevertheless,
UNHCR would need die consent of die host State, altiiough how
voluntary diat consent might be is open to question; when one million
Rwandans crossed into die former Zaire fleeing die RPF as it took power,
Kinshasa could have lawfully refused to permit die establishment of die
camps along its border, however politically and economically its choice
was constrained. The intricate relationship of die host State and UNHCR
as regards die establishment and running of camps is a matter requiring
further review.
UNHCR may not have intended to expand in die direction of camps,
but tiiese are now seen as critical to its protection mission.
Food, shelter, health care and other forms of assistance are essential to the
survival and safety of displaced populations, and constitute a vital form of human
rights protection in their own right, especially in situations where civilian
populations are subject to deliberate deprivation — including starvation — by
the parties to the conflict67
Protection, UNHCR's primary responsibility, has necessitated die
simultaneous provision of assistance and relief. Moreover, UNHCR also
recognizes diat this type of work attracts funding from donor governments,
65
 See EXCOM Conclusion 22 (XXXII) 1981, §111.
66
 See above note.
67
 'UNHCR 2000', above, note 11, para. 49.
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unlike, for instance, legal protection in Western Europe. To that extent,
the extension of the 'empire' is actively pursued.
It is now evident that the resources available to multilateral organizations will
come under growing pressure in the immediate future. Donors also seem likely
to channel their contributions selectively, favouring programmes and operations
which diey consider to be of the greatest strategic importance. As recent
experience has amply demonstrated, relatively large amounts of money may be
available for activities which benefit war-affected populations, while refugee
programmes of the more traditional type fail to attract sufficient resources.68
Another increasing aspect of UNHCR's work with refugees is repatriation.
While voluntary repatriation is mentioned as one of its functions in the
Statute,69 UNHCR has appeared to treat it as its primary response to
refugee influxes in recent years.70 It is laid down as a task of UNHCR in
article 1.5 of the Dayton Agreement and in the Quadripartite Agreement.71
Until a few years ago, it was assumed that repatriation could take place only
after a significant change in the political order of the refugee creating country,
or following a peace settlement Today, voluntary repatriation is considered the
most desirable solution to humanitarian crises, and active steps are being
taken to create favourable security, political, human rights and socio-economic
conditions to enable refugees and displaced persons to return home. Voluntary
repatriation is now taking place to relatively safe and secure areas in countries
engulfed in internal conflict or in the absence of a peace agreement.72
Whether Rwanda was safe at the end of 1996 when there were mass
returns from camps in Burundi, the former Zaire and Tanzania is open
to question, and Amnesty International has accused UNHCR of ignoring
the human rights situation in Rwanda at that time.73 It is, without doubt,
one of the main areas where the rights and responsibilities of UNHCR
need reconsideration.
68
 'UNHCR 2000', above, note 11, para. 68.
69
 Above, note 28, paras. 1, 8(c) and 9. See also EXCOM Conclusions 18 (XXXI) 1980, 40
(XXXVI) 1985, and 74 (XLV) 1994; Note on International Protection (submitted by the High
Commissioner), paras. 35-8, 9 Sept. 1991. M. Zicck, UNHCR and Vohmicaj Repatriation of Refugees: A
Lend Analysis, 1997.
A slightly different outcome occurred in Eritrea where the government appeared not to want
the refugees to return and expelled UNHCR workers for preparing an information pack on
repatriation: GumHan, 7 May 1997, 11.
71
 Below, note 97. See also, T. Bucheli, The Returnees to the Gali Area: A Discussion Paper',
UNOMIG 1996, 13-14, 22, andj . Walter, 'Peacekeeping by the CIS and the United Nations in
Abkhazia/Georgia and Tajikistan', [1996] Infl Ptaakeepmg 78.
72
 Ogata, 'World OroVj', 2-3. UNHCR has assisted the voluntary repatriation of 900,000 Somalis
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 See Amnesty International, 'Rwanda. Human rights overlooked in mass repatriation', 17, AI
Index AFR 47/02/97, 14Jan. 1997; 'Great Lakes Region. Still in need of Protection: Repatriation,
Refoulemcnt and the Safety of Refugees and the Internally Displaced', 5, AI Index AFR 02/07/
97, 24 Jan. 1997. Cf. Morris, "Protection Dilemmas', 494-5. Within UNHCR, die return from the
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One of the greatest challenges facing UNHCR at present, and one which is
likely to grow in the years ahead, concerns the organization's involvement in
situations where refugees are returning to their own country because of external
pressures or an absence of realistic alternatives.74
UNHCR is left balancing the competing interests of the host State, the
source State and the refugees.
Internally displaced persons are, by definition, not refugees because
they have not crossed an international frontier. Thus, UNHCR has no
express statutory mandate to be concerned with them. However, being
within their own State, they are of concern to international law as part
of human rights law and, given that displacement will often arise as a
result of armed conflict, of die international law of armed conflict, which
will view diem like any other group of civilians.75 To a limited extent,
UNHCR's work widi internally displaced persons has been recognized
by the General Assembly since 1972. The UNHCR Executive
Committee has also sanctioned work widi internally displaced persons in
certain circumstances.77 The High Commissioner became involved in
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 upon die request of die Secretary-General,78
dealing widi, at diat time, internally displaced persons outside die
traditional mandate; tiiis extension at die direction of die Secretary-
General was continued in die Dayton Agreement.79 Furthermore, work
widi internally displaced persons could also be seen as a necessary part
of die functions of UNHCR's mandate to work widi refugees.80 Thus,
where UNHCR is assisting in die repatriation of refugees, a function
under die Statute, it may well be diat as a matter of necessity it has
similarly to provide assistance to internally displaced persons.81 In 1996,
UNHCR produced its own reference manual for staff regarding
international legal standards, based on die Deng report to die Commission
74
 ' U N H C R 2 0 0 0 ' , above , note 1 1 , at p a r a . 25 . Sec also, V o l u m e 9:4 of the International Journal
ofRefitgit Law ( O c t o b e r 1997), which focuses o n the ques t ion of repat r ia t ion .
75
 L.T. Lee, 'Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Internal Conflicts', 3 ILSA J. Infl &
Comp.L 529 (1997).
74
 UNGA res.2958 (XXVII), 1972.
77
 E X C O M Conclusion 75 (XLV) 1994. See also, U N H C R , 'Protection aspects of U N H C R
activities on behalf of internally displaced persons ' : U N doc . E C / S C P / 8 7 , Aug. 94. O n the effect
in international law of E X C O M decisions, see above, note 30.
78
 See E.D. Mooncy, 'Presence, ergo Protection? UNPROFOR, UNHCR and the ICRC in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina', 7 IJRL 407, 419-20 (1995).
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 1—21 Nov. 1995, Annex 7 Article HJ. 1. See also the Quadr ipar t i te Agreement re Abkhazia ,
below, note 97. Initially, the High Commiss ioner was to have had a similar role in relation to the
Grea t Lakes region; the Secretary-General eventually appointed a Special Envoy to work widi all
affected governments and involved agencies, including U N H C R ; see U N SC res. 1078 (1996), paras .
10, 13. At one time, die special envoy was d ie Assistant High Commissioner.
™ See the Reparations Cast, above, no te 17, a t 182.
81
 See U N H C R , UNHCRi Operational Experience of Hitting with Intemalif Displaced Persons, 1994,
3—10, 37-55. On the compatibility of assisting internally displaced persons and fulfilling its mandate
to refugees, see R. Cohen, 'Refugees and Human Rights', Refugee Policy Group, Feb. 1995, 13-14.
Rights, Legitimate Expectations, Needs and Responsibilities 363
on Human Rights.82 Internal displacement often has the same causes as
international refugee movements,83 and there is no doubt that persons
forced to flee their home have need for humanitarian assistance. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for instance, consistent
with its mandate, focuses on the context in which the victims are suffering
rather than distinguishing between them on die basis of die victim's
reaction, to flee or stay. UNHCR, however, is not a general humanitarian
organization, yet to view working with internally displaced persons as 'an
exceptional occurrence' while refugees who cross an international border
remain its central concern84 is to ignore reality, whether mis should be
UNHCR's role is simply a redundant question. The question is how this
role should be regularized. The Representative of the Secretary-General
on Internally Displaced Persons presented a new set of Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement to die Commission on Human Rights in 1998,
proposing a definition or description which requires only diat die internally
displaced person or group of persons have been forced to flee, 'in particular
as a result of or in order to avoid die effects of armed conflict, situations
of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-
made disasters .. .l85 Whetiier diere will be a United Nations High
Commissioner for Displaced Persons in die future, responsible for die
protection of all diose displaced regardless of whedier diey have crossed
an international border, remains to be seen.
Associated widi internally displaced persons, and in some ways similar
to camps, UNHCR has had to deal widi 'safe areas'.86 UNHCR has
welcomed die link between human rights violations, refugee flows and
direats to international peace and security,87 which developed from UN
Security Council resolution 688 (1991) on die Kurdish safe haven in
Northern Iraq, but still has its concerns about die operation of safe
82
 F. Deng, Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, 'Compilation
and Analysis of Legal Norms', UN doc. E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2.
85
 Sec G. Gilbert, 'Root Causes and International Law: Refiigee Flowi in the 1990s', 11 J^QJiR
413(1993).
84
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internally displaced persons cannot readily be separated from refugees; cither rhey will be mixed up
with returning populations or alleviating their plight might prevent a transborder influx into a
neighbouring State. See also, High Commissioner's Memo No.33/93, 28 Apr. 1993, UNHCR's
Role with In ternal ly Displaced Persons , in"UMHCRi Operational Experience with Internally Displaced
Persons, above , note 8 1 , A n n e x I.
85
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by Simon Bagshaw and Walter Kalin, below at 547-72.
86
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areas.88 Given that most conflicts today are non-international and
fragmented, there is less respect for the laws of war, coupled with an
inability readily to distinguish those fighting from civilians. As such,
protection of all civilians within die safe area, the internally displaced
and those ordinarily resident there, both groups outside UNHCR's normal
mandate, is difficult to achieve;89 safe areas may even have the effect of
placing those outside that area in even greater jeopardy.90
Related to internally displaced persons, but sufficiently distinct so as
to raise new issues concerning die scope of its mandate, UNHCR has
also sought to provide in-country protection. The question arises as to
what extent internally displaced persons should have rights beyond diose
of persons equally affected by an acute crisis, but who have not fled their
homes.
The question then arises as to a possible development of the law. This is a delicate
matter, for there are already many legal regulations, and, when new rules are
created (e.g. a convention on displaced persons), care must be taken not to
undermine the existing law. Another moot point is the advisability of creating rules
aimed solely at protecting displaced persons, which could result in discrimination
against other victims who also deserve to be protected.91
When operating in-country, UNHCR is working widi people who are
not even internally displaced, almough internally displaced persons may
be part of a mixed community. The logic behind this extension of its
activities is that if UNHCR can 'ameliorate refugee-producing conditions',
then it is protecting potential refugees.92 Additionally, where the Statute
lays down that UNHCR will seek permanent solutions, including
repatriation,93 diis is to be 'by assisting Governments'; since repatriation
must be voluntary, the government to be assisted must be diat of the
source State, again providing support for in-country activities. UNHCR
can only be successful in ameliorating refugee-producing conditions and
in securing conditions conducive to voluntary repatriation by improving
circumstances for die entire population.
The importance of this issue, however, lies in how far UNHCR's
88
 See TJNHCR 2000', above, note 11, para. 36, and Landgrcn, 'Safety Zones', 457-8. In practice
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extension of its in-country work should develop from providing simple
humanitarian relief to more general in-State support, such as restoration
of civil society.94 Examples of in-country work can be seen in UNHCR's
role in Bosnia-Herzegovina,95 where it was reaffirmed as lead agency for
humanitarian relief under the Dayton Agreement,96 in Abkhazia/Georgia
under the Quadripartite Agreement of 1994,97 and in its leading role in
co-ordinating regional strategies, such as that in the CIS.98 However,
UNHCR is not a general humanitarian organization, and there are
dangers in providing in-country protection.99 Thus, merely by increasing
its in-State role delivering humanitarian relief, UNHCR's activities may
result in people being unable to obtain refugee status in other countries
and it may no longer be perceived as acting entirely non-politically.100
Furthermore, if UNHCR's personality in international law is to be
established by its attendant duties and obligations,101 this extension of its
duties and obligations must accord it greater rights and responsibilities,
as well, at least on an ad hoc basis.
Finally, before looking at the rights and responsibilities of UNHCR,
one needs to consider the consequences of changing the primary focus
from the protection of refugees, to providing humanitarian relief to all
displaced persons.102 It would, even in that case, be difficult to ignore
protection, at least in so far as it accompanies the provision of humanitarian
relief.103 The difference is that humanitarian relief can be provided
anywhere, increasing the pressure to return refugees to their own country.
Where war or human rights violations were still occurring in the source
State, protection might still be provided in other parts of that State, even
in 'safe areas'. Protection would become relative, to be balanced against
the ability to supply adequate resources in-country. This is not to say,
94
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however, that the mandate is not flexible; law, for the mandate should
reflect the law relating to the international protection of refugees, is a
tool for engineering desired results. The law simply provides parameters
within which to act and legitimates authority for those actions. The
mandate can and must adapt to circumstances, but the Statute and 1951
Convention cannot be ignored; expansion must not undermine the original
mandate.104
It is also feared that international protection, with its basis in
international law, will become peripheral to the work of UNHCR, even
to the point that legal protection will give way to political expedience.105
However, UNHCR's role is changing and the original mandate needs
refinement. A reconsideration, though, of UNHCR's rights and
responsibilities to make diem fit for die times, always bearing in mind its
Statute, the 1951 Convention and earlier Executive Committee
Conclusions, would provide a legal underpinning for its activities and
reassert its protective function.'06
3.2 Rights, Needs apd Legitimate Expectations
Given increased interventionism in humanitarian crises, what rights does
UNHCR need? Merely drawing up some new charter of rights which
might subsequendy be ignored by parties to a conflict would be a
redundant exercise.107 However, if rights are down on paper and reflect
what UNHCR truly needs to function in a humanitarian crisis, then it
gives the international community a tool by which to apply pressure to
104
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recalcitrant States. This section examines the needs of UNHCR if it is
to carry out its extended activities, taking account of its current rights.
3.2.1 Intervention*08 to carry out the mandate
UNHCR's Model Agreement self-evidently presupposes that it will be
acting with the consent of the host government The Agreement is
drafted in terms intended to enable UNHCR to carry out its mandate:
Article HI.4 The Government shall at all times grant UNHCR personnel
unimpeded access to refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR . . .
Article XVII. 2 This Agreement shall be interpreted in the light of its primary
purpose, which is to enable UNHCR to cany out its international mandate for
refugees fully and efficiently and to attain its humanitarian objectives in the
country.
For example, the Quadripartite Agreement expressly provides that
UNHCR is to have direct and unhindered access to all displaced persons
and refugees from Abkhazia.110
However, is there a general right of access by UNHCR and, if so, for
what purposes? Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the ICRC, has argued
that there is a right to intervene to provide humanitarian assistance to a
civilian population in time of international armed conflict1" and that this
should not be seen as an interference with the sovereignty of the State."2
Sandoz also has recognized a right of victims to receive assistance, but
noted that it was not without limitations:"3
There are . . . limits to this right, relating to the nature of the agency offering
to bring assistance and checks on the consignments. Indeed, the obligation to
allow free passage to relief consignments being sent to the civilian population of
108
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a party to a conflict, including the adverse party, may be made conditional upon
checks to ensure that the contents are distributed exclusively to those for whom
they are intended. Moreover, the parties to the conflict are bound to give a
formal reply to any request to conduct an international relief operation, which
must be humanitarian and impartial in nature, on their territory.
With regard to article 70 of Protocol I and article 18.2 of Protocol II,"4
the limitations are so great that it is difficult to discern any 'right': they
both need the consent of the host State which can still subject any
delivery to such scrutiny that any perishable goods would not survive the
journey;"5 moreover, in practice, deliveries also need the consent of all
the interested parties along the route."6 Sandoz argues that the limitations
cannot be used to frustrate the supply of aid, for that would violate
principles of the international law of armed conflict, such as not starving
a civilian population to death."7 However, the international law of armed
conflict does not ordinarily grant rights to individuals, but more usually,
it imposes obligations on States. Human rights law, particularly the right
to life set out in all human rights conventions, might found a claim to
humanitarian relief for the purpose of ensuring survival, but even then
that would not necessarily translate into granting UNHCR a right
of access to refugees nor any other persons of concern to the High
Commissioner.'18
A Chapter VTI resolution of the Security Council could require a State
to grant access to a particular organization or organizations as part of
maintaining or restoring international peace and security."9 As stated
above, UNHCR has actively welcomed the Link in United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) resolution 688 (1991) between gross human rights
violations, forced displacement and the threat to international peace and
114
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" N. Morris, 'Humanitarian Aid and Neutrality1, paras. 13 and 8 (paper presented to a symposium
organized by La Fondatvm pour la Etudes dt Difmst, 16-17 June 1995). Published in French as part of
the collection of conference proceedings in Operations des Nahons Units — Ltpms dt Terrain. I am
grateful to Nicholas Morris for a copy of the paper in English to which reference is made.
119
 See UNSC res. 941 (1994), para. 5, above, note 49. See also, Roberts, 'Humanitarian Action',
19flT. Ch. VTI may be the only solution where a State deliberately blocks aid to part of its population
in a non-international armed conflict; see the allegations of die International Federation of Human
Rights Leagues with regard to Belgrade's actions in Kosovo: Guardian, 9 Sept. 1998, 11.
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security.120 UNSC resolution 824 (1993), as well as unilaterally stipulating
that Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac were to be designated
safe areas, required parties to the conflict to give humanitarian relief
agencies unimpeded access to the safe areas.12' Furthermore, acting under
Chapter VII, the Security Council could always impose relief on a
recalcitrant or ineffectual State.122 Nevertheless, there is not enough
supporting evidence to establish an independent right in UNHCR of
access to refugees or others of concern in conflict situations.
Beyond conflict situations, it is implicit in the Statute that UNHCR
will have access, but the Statute is only a General Assembly resolution.
The question is, whether the implicit dimension has become a rule of
customary international law. Recent evidence from Thailand123 and
Kenya124 shows that UNHCR will only act in conformity with the State's
domestic practice vis-a-vis refugees, which would suggest no 'right' in
UNHCR, and that access remains a privilege granted by the State.125
That States generally give access is no proof that UNHCR has any right
in the matter as against States.
In sum, international humanitarian law may provide a basis for
developing a right of intervention to provide humanitarian relief,
constrained only by the practical consequences of an armed conflict.
Where there is no armed conflict, one further area for development for
UNHCR would be a more generalized right of intervention to provide
protection and relief to displaced persons. A right to intervene in situations
other than those of armed conflict would need to be premised on an
equivalent level of disruption to an armed conflict If there is a transborder
element, then the host State will usually be willing to receive outside help
with respect to relief, but may not welcome the protection that such
organizations provide against forced repatriation.126 If the situation only
involves internally displaced persons, then, as under article 18.2 of Protocol
II,127 State consent will be necessary unless matters are so bad that UN
120
 'UNHCR 2000', above, note 11, at para. 36.
121
 See Mooney, 'Presence, ergo protection?', 416. Access was not forthcoming. Cf. the experience
of Open Relief Centres in Sri Lanka which were set up consensually: Landgrcn, 'Safety Zones', 452;
Guardian, 4 Sept. 1998, 15 (Serbian constraints on aid centres in Kosovo).
See the Memorandum of Understanding between Iraq and the Allies, above, note 15; indeed,
it has been Turkey which has impeded access.
' See Human Rights Watch/Asia, 'Burma/Thailand; No Safety in Burma, No Sanctuary in
Thailand', HRW Short Report, voL9:6, 18, Jul. 1997.
124
 Guanfem, 31 Jul. 1997, 9.
123
 UNGA res.51/75, 12 Dec. 1996, para. 6 (at 309), only 'emphasizes the importance of ensuring
access' by UNHCR, indicating that it is not an obligation of States.
126
 Cf. the Tanzania Crisis of late 1996, where UNHCR did litde to prevent the mass expulsion
of Rwandese back to Rwanda, having already agreed the date of their return with the Tanzanian
government; Amnesty International, 'Great Lakes', 2, 7-9. The issue is discussed in detail below.
127
 Above, note 111.
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authorized humanitarian intervention would be justified;128 it may be
either that a State is engaging in gross human rights violations or that
the economy has deteriorated so far or that there is some natural disaster
and, as a consequence, that the population is suffering severely.129
At present, there is no right, as such, of access to provide protection,
or to intervene to provide relief. At best, UNHCR may be able to claim
under humanitarian law that it has a right to offer assistance, although
it may not want to do so without some recognition of its right to offer
protection. Where a State permits130 UNHCR to provide relief, then
UNHCR will be acting lawfully, but that is not the same as saying
UNHCR has a right of access to provide protection.131
3.2.2 Protection in the Host State™2
Article VI. 5 of the Model Agreement obliges the government of the host
State to 'take the necessary measures, when required, to ensure the
security and protection of the premises of the UNHCR office and its
personnel'.
The Quadripartite Agreement provides for a joint guarantee of United
Nations' and the co-operating agencies' staff and property by the Russian
Federation, the Georgian side and the Abkhaz side.133 Thus, UNHCR
will seek die protection of not just the host State, but also groups in
control of territory where it will be operating and any independent
security force. Sometimes, however, it should be able to call on the
international community where host-State protection is not forthcoming
128
 See N.S. Rodley, 'Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights', in Rodley, N., ed, To
Loose the Bands of Wickedness (1992). See also, R.B. LiHich, Humanitarian Intervention and the Umttd Nations,
1973; JJM. Moore, Law and Civil War in the Modtm World, 1974; T. Franck & N.S. Rodley, 'After
Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force', 67 AJIL 275 (1973); F.R.
T e s o n , Humanitarian Intervention (1988) .
129
 See UNSC res.688 (1991), above, note 15, which linked intervention by relief organizations
with repression of part of a population by the State and a threat to international peace and security.
See also, Landgren, 'Safety Zones', 454—5.
130
 Sometimes the permission will be implied, such as where a State has collapsed and there is
no central authority to give permission; see quotation in text at note 34 above. In those circumstances,
the humanitarian crisis will involve internally displaced persons, not refugees, and no one would
claim UNHCR has a 'right' of access to them. Moreover, States do not collapse without warnings
so it is likely that UNHCR will already be operating in such a State widi the permission of the
previous administration; whether those who gain de facto control of an area of a collapsed State will
honour such permission is doubtful (I am grateful to Nicholas Morris for sharing his views on this
matter).
" ' It is arguable that a Contracting State would be under a duty to co-operate with UNHCR in
its protection function under art 35 CSR51. On die other hand, the State's obligations under art.
6 ICCPR66 (right to life) and art 11 ICESCR66 (to take appropriate steps to ensure the realization
of everyone's right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food), do not add to the
argument that UNHCR should have a right of access for the purpose of protection, particularly
since derogations from art. 11 would be permissible during die crisis.
152
 See also Convention on die Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 1974, 13 ILM 42 (1974).
133
 Above, note 97, para.(e).
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or is inappropriate.134 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNHCR needed the
support of UNPROFOR because the Bosnian forces could not provide
protection in Serb-held areas;135 in the former Zaire, UNHCR was left
with no UN protection in the camps and had to rely finally on 1,500 of
former President Mobutu's elite guard.136 Given the fragmented nature
of conflicts, the idea mat UNHCR could derive all the security it needs
from the host State is decidedly anachronistic; at times, and where
possible, a joint agreement with all warring factions within a State may
be adequate, but if the international community wishes UNHCR to
'solve' refugee crises, it must be willing to provide protection to unarmed
humanitarian relief workers.137 The respect which UNHCR and the
ICRC used automatically to receive from all parties is a thing of the
past,138 and the risks for aid workers have increased.139 As with
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,140 it should be
possible for non-State entities to1 undertake that they will abide by an
agreement on rights and responsibilities in humanitarian crises; at
present, rebel groups have no incentive to respect the security of relief
workers, but if tfieir ultimate goal was to take over the State or
secession, then compliance with a convention guaranteeing the security
of those providing humanitarian relief might be seen as a means, no
154
 See Sadako Ogata, 'Peace, Security and Humanitarian Action', Alastair Buchan Memorial
Lecture, IISS, London, 3 Apr. 1997.
According to Mooney, 'Presence, ergo protection?', 418—19, that support was not always
forthcoming, but her view that UNPROFOR did nothing while UNHCR convoys came under fire
a questionable as a generalization. UNPROFOR would return fire if it was possible to locate the
source and that was widiin range. Moreover, UNPROFOR did not have access to all parts of
Bosnia-Herzegovina; some towns were reached through die Krajina in Croatia. Finally, in some
instances in central Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was the Bosnian government forces diat attacked the
convoys in an attempt to provoke military intervention.
1
 Amnesty International, 'Great Lakes', 4. Sec also, Ogata, 'Peace, Security and Humanitarian
Action'.
137
 Sec Roberts, 'Humanitarian Action', 5Iff. See also Guardian, 22 Sept 1998, 7 (statement to
General Assembly by die British Prime Minister on UK's willingness to enter agreement with UN
on provision of troops to support UN's role as 'guardian of global peace and security"). It needs to
be clearly stated diat if there is the political will to use force to ensure the delivery of relief, then it
would be better directed to reaching a settlement of me cause of me displacement However, there
are short-term and long-term objectives and during the process of dealing widi me cause of the
displacement it will remain necessary to meet die immediate needs of the affected population, in
terms of protection and assistance. See also Guardian, 6 Aug. 1998, 18 (statement by Executive
Director of WFP on famine in Sudan).
"" See the Guardian, 17 Feb. 1997, 1O, 18 Feb. 1997, 12, on the successful outcome to a hostage-
taking of UN and ICRC personnel by a Tajik 'warlord'. However, an ICRC representative was
murdered in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 18 May 1992, Uiree Spanish aid workers were killed in Rwanda
in Jan. 1997 by extremist Hutu militants: Guardian, 21 Jan. 1997, 12, and four ICRC workers were
killed by rebels in Sierra Leone: Guardian, 17 Oct 1998, 17.
139
 One option is to dose a camp where workers are at risk; see Landgren, 'Safety Zones', 452
on Sri l-anlan Open Relief Centres.
140
 Above, note 111, art 96.3.
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matter how remote, of proving to the international community that
they are responsible and organized.141
For the time being, the Convention on the Safety of United Nations
and Associated Personnel142 may be of limited assistance. Articles 7 to 9
provide that a host State is to protect UN and associated personnel in
any UN operation to maintain or restore 'international peace and security,
or where the Security Council or die General Assembly has declared...
that there exists an exceptional risk to the safety of the personnel
participating in the operation'.'43 Such personnel shall not be taken
hostage and, if they are, then they shall be promptly released, and States
are to make criminal certain offences committed against them. While the
Convention is well-intentioned, it may not be effective in achieving its
ends, simply because intervention in humanitarian crises tends to be of
a mixed military and humanitarian nature. The actions of the military
arm of the intervention may well put in jeopardy the safety and security
of humanitarian workers on the ground. Furthermore, there is nodiing
to bind rebel forces in the Convention144 and the direat of criminal
prosecution for hostage taking or article 9 crimes has a limited deterrent
quality against persons waging a war against their government.145 This
Convention would have had more chance of achieving its goal if it had
taken an inclusive approach to die parties to the conflict. Protection of
humanitarian workers in the increasingly fragmented conflicts requires
the participation of all parties to a conflict, but will likely only be accepted
by States if it does not enhance the claim of any rebel group.
3.2.3 The support of Western States
UNHCR depends on financial support, perhaps has a legitimate
expectation in that regard, but hardly has a right to it. It is extremely
difficult to maintain neutrality if financial support for die organization's
work is not guaranteed, however, and UNHCR should not need to have
141
 Some might argue that such an agreement would result in peacekeepers being put at greater
risk. However, peacekeepers are normally armed to protect themselves, have rules of engagement
and, generally, are put at risk because they have been deployed where there is no peace to keep;
where conflict still rages, or even quietly smoulders, peacekeepers are at risk, while their presence
may effectively threaten the independent, non-partisan status of relief workers. Ogata, 'Peace,
Security and Humanitarian Action, 6—7.
142
 UN doc. A/RES/49/59, 9 Dec. 1994 (hereinafter, the UN Personnel Convention); 34 ILM
482 (1995). See also, Summary Report of the 1CRC/GIIS Seminar on the Security of Humanitarian
Personnel in the Field for NGOs, 5 Dec. 1997; M-C. Bourloyannis-Vrailas, 'Safety and Security of
United Nations Personnel in Areas of Internal Armed Conflict', 48 RHD195, 104ff(1995).
143
 Art l(c).
144
 Cf. Art 96(3), Protocol I, above, note 111. There is a duty to disseminate information about
the Convention: art. 19.
145
 Indeed, given the threat of being pursued for art. 9 crimes throughout the world, because of
States' obligations under arts. 13—15 to extradite or prosecute, there may be a temptation to murder
hostages in order to leave no witnesses. See also, Hampson, 'States' Military Operations', at note
29 and accompanying text.
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to rely on eye-catching international humanitarian crises to encourage
donor States to meet the known and ongoing costs of the organization.
The financial commitment is part of a wider obligation to share in the
overall cost of displacement.147 Burden sharing can be achieved not just
by taking in refugees, but, where appropriate, through sending troops to
assist in the stabilization process or by financial contributions to current
costs during a humanitarian crisis14* and to the rebuilding of the economy.
Donors and international financial institutions must be drawn more systematically
into the peace-building process. For it is unreasonable to expect the world's war-
torn States to manage the triple transition from conflict to peace, from dictatorship
to participatory governance, and from centralized or shattered economic systems
to market economies, without experiencing new forms of social conflict, political
instability, persecution and displacement149
On the other hand, Western States ought not to close their borders to
refugees.150 Refugee problems are not solved by ensuring that displaced
persons are 'protected' in camps inside the source State or just across the
border.151 It does not follow that because Western States are contributing,
militarily or financially, to a humanitarian crisis at source, that they
thereby fulfil all their obligations to refugees from the area.152 Under
article 35 of the 1951 Convention, States parties are to co-operate with
UNHCR in the exercise of its functions, but as that Office has pointed
out,
[Governments] do not always respect this responsibility and in recent years have
manifested a growing tendency to challenge the basic tenets of refugee protection.
In these difficult circumstances, UNHCR relies to a great extent on its moral
authority . . . to ensure that States and other actors act in accordance with
international refugee law and humanitarian principles.153
146
 See UNGA res.51/75, 12 Dec. 1996, para. 20, (311-12); Guardian, 9 Sept 1998, 11 (UNHCR
appeals for 33 million to 'avert tragedy' in Kosovo); see also, A. Acharya and D.B. Dewitt, 'Fiscal
Burden Sharing', in J.C. Hathaway, ed., Reconcemng International Refugee Law, 1997, 11 Iff.
SeeJ.C. Hathaway and R.A. Neve, 'Toward the Reformulation of International Refugee Law:
A Model for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection', paper prepared as part of York
University's Center for Refugee Studies' Research Project, 'Toward the Reformulation oflnternational
Refugee Law", Sept. 1996, 58-60.
148
 See Hampson, 'States' Military Operations', 382; Hathaway and Neve, 'Toward the
Reformulation', 54ff.
149
 'UNHCR 2000', above, note 11, at para. 60. See also, Ogata, -World Order1, 2.
With the tragic consequences seen in the Adriatic Sea when an Italian warship interdicted a
vessel carrying persons fleeing the collapse of Albania; Guardian, 31 Mar. 1997, 10; Goodwin-Gill,
The Refugee in International Law, 161—7. See also the Turkish action on its Eastern frontier in the build-
up to threatened conflict between Iraq and the United States and United Kingdom: Guardian, 10
Feb. 1998, 11.
Cf. Germany's desire that Kosovar Albanians do not come to Germany but remain in the
Cursed Mountains of high Albania; Guardian, 17 Jun. 1998, 11; 16 SepL 1998, 3.
' See the Statute, above, note 28, at para. 8(d). Cf. Hathaway and Neve, Toward die
Reformulation', 54.
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 'UNHCR 2000', above, note 11, at para. 62; Guardian, 20 Mar. 1997, 14.
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One of the damning indictments of some Western States' attitude to
people fleeing the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as Mooney points
out,154 was their reluctance to take refugees because, in their eyes, the
presence of UNPROFOR, UNHCR and the ICRC meant that there
was adequate protection from persecution at home.155 Not only did this
ignore the reality of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it also failed to
meet international obligations to permit individuals to seek asylum and
not to return them to inhuman and degrading treatment or torture.156
Fear of permanent settlement in the State giving refuge may have led to
this minimalist approach to rights for displaced persons,157 but the work
of UNHCR in-State should not limit other States' obligations to all
persons seeking protection under the 1951 Convention and customary
international law.158
Finally, UNHCR should be able to expect Western States to do all in
their power, even where this is very little, to prevent refugee flows.159
Many displacements result from armed conflict or gross human rights
violations, and the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I require
all High Contracting Parties to ensure respect for the laws expressed
therein; secondly, there is a similar obligation in the European and
American Conventions on Human Rights,160 while the United Nations
Charter requires member States to pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action to achieve universal respect for and observance of human
rights.161
UNHCR may have to play a more active role in the political arena, encouraging
States and non-State actors to acknowledge their responsibility for the causes
and consequences of forced population movements and the protection of displaced
people.162
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 'Presence, ergo protection?', 408-9.
155
 See also, Landgren, 'Safety Zones', 438.
156
 Chahdv Umted Kingdom, (70/1995/576/662), 15 Nov. 1996: 9 1JRL86 (1997), concerning the
refiosal of refugee status to a person from India. It may be, however, that returning refugees to a
region of a State under the control of their own ethnic group, but not wholly secure, would not
amount to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Cf. Turkey's proposal to set up, with European
Union funding, reception centres from which UNHCR would be excluded (Council of the European
Union, 6938/1/98, Rev.l, 21 Apr. 1998, from the Presidency to the K4 Committee); the EU
rejected this plan on the basis that refugees might become the victims of nfimlenmt Guardian, 29 May
1998, 15.
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 Cf. J-F. Durieux, e-mail menage, 15 Aug. 1996, to Centre for Refugee Studies Reformulation
Project.
See Goodwin -Gi l l , The Rrfugr in International Law, 167ff.
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 For fuller treatment, see Gilbert, 'Root Causes'.
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 ETS 5 (1950) and 9 ILM 673 (1970).
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 Am. 55 and 56.
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 "UNHCR 2000', above, note 11, at para. 15. And see V. Gowfland-Debbas, 'La responsabihte
internationale de l'Etat d'origine pour des flux de refiigics', paper presented at Soditf fmnpnst pour It
dmi international, 1997.
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Intervention in another State is still seen as a violation of sovereignty,
even where the protection of displaced persons is concerned. Nevertheless,
the greater facility within the Security Council to reach agreement allowed
for the establishment of the Kurdish safe area in Northern Iraq. That
was done swifdy, as a result of the particular circumstances, while die
international community abdicated responsibility for die Abkhaz
crisis,'63 was slow to take effective action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
arguably never did so in relation to die Great Lakes Crisis.164 Mooney
even suggests that die presence of UNPROFOR, UNHCR and the ICRC
in Bosnia-Herzegovina actually acted as a human shield protecting die
Serb (and occasionally Croatian) forces from intervention by die West.165
In the view of die High Commissioner,
It is accepted that multilateral action has a role to play in preventing armed
conflicts and negotiating peace agreements in internal conflicts. It is less clear
to see how these actors — states, political and opinion leaders, NGOs and
international organizations — can be mobilized on a long-term path to building
peace. Can the large number of activities required for dealing with conflicts and
the transition from war to peace, such as peace-keeping, electoral assistance,
human rights promotion, demobilisation, refugee repatriation, humanitarian
assistance and development aid be sequenced, co-ordinated and, most
importantly, sustained to reach the point of preventing the recurrence of violence?
The tool of indirect intervention through humanitarian action has become
increasingly crucial but is not enough.166
To diis, Morris adds tiiat, 'Humanitarian action saves lives but cannot
substitute for die political will necessary to reach peace . . . In die absence
of die necessary political will, and especially when substituting for it,
humanitarian action risks being compromised or perceived as
compromised . . .'167
3.2.4 Problems
Many conflicts are now fragmented, widiout any one party being in
control in die State; sometimes, indeed, States appear to be no more
dian die lines on die map, widi no central audiority.168 There are also
1
 While UNHCR and Russia were parties to the Quadripartite Agreement, above, note 97, it
is alleged that the Russians used their position to further their own goals in Abkhazia; see E.D.
Mooney, 'Internal Displacement and the Conflict in Abkhazia", 3 QGR 197, 218ff(1996).
164
 See Landgren, 'Safety Zones', 447-8, and Amnesty International, 'Great Lakes', 13. The
Carnegie Commission has called for a standing United Nations rapid reaction force to meet similar
crises: 'Preventing Deadly Conflict", 1998.
165
 Mooney, 'Presence, ergo protection?', 434. More likely, only UNPROFOR wai an effective
shield.
166
 Ogata, 'World Order', 6.
' See Morris, 'Humanitarian Aid and Neutrality", para. 1.
168
 See Ogata, "World Order", 2; also, 'UNHCR 200C, above, note 11, para. 38: 'In certain
instances and especially when State authority is weak, has collapsed or is only gradually reasserting
itself, an international presence in die form of peacekeeping forces, humanitarian organizations and
human rights monitors can create a situation of shared responsibility towards civilian populations.'
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cases where States do not co-operate. In Northern Iraq, for example,
Operation Provide Comfort was arguably an occupying force, rather
than one engaged in providing assistance with consent;169 only when there
was the Memorandum of Understanding with die United Nations did
the relief effort become consensual.170
It has been suggested above that humanitarian agencies may have a
right, subject to meeting certain criteria, to provide relief, but that diis
will place diem in apparent opposition to diose fighting against die
population in need of assistance. In non-international armed conflicts,
particularly inter-ethnic conflicts, the distinction between die civilians and
those fighting may be difficult to draw. In providing relief for besieged
Bosnian Muslims, for instance, UNHCR would often need the help of
UNPROFOR to carry out the delivery and would appear to be acting
against die Bosnian Serbs. Relief work is meant to be non-partisan, but
one of the intended objectives of die conflict in die former Yugoslavia
was to force people to flee, so uiat giving one side the resources to allow
them to remain led unavoidably to UNHCR seeming to favour one party
to the conflict.171
Any system of rights and responsibilities for humanitarian agencies
must recognize tiiese problems.172 Providing relief by force challenges
accepted tenets of relief and puts relief workers on die ground at risk of
unjustified retaliation.173
3.3 The Responsibilities of UNHCR
If UNHCR needs greater audiority because of its more interventionist
role, die necessary corollary is tiiat it, and odier agencies acting in a
similar manner, must assume greater responsibilities.' It is arguable tiiat
on die basis of die Certain Expenses of the United Nations case,175 a distinction
can be drawn between actions widiin the spirit and intendment of
UNHCR's Statute which are improperly carried out, and those which
are beyond what is widiin its functional objectives — die latter might
leave it responsible for its actions. Article 13 of the ILC Draft Code
on State Responsibility provides diat die conduct of an international
169
 Hampson, 'States' Military Operations', 397-8, and Lavoyer, 'Refugees and IDPs', 176.
170
 Sec above, note 15.
171
 See Ogata, 'Peace, Security and Humanitarian Action', 4; Morris, 'Humanitarian Aid and
Neutrality', paras. 4—9. The ICRC seems to be more prepared to eschew the help of the military
in order to maintain its neutral status; see C. Sommaruga, 'Humanitarian Action and Peace-Keeping
Operations', 317 1RRC 178, 179 (1997).
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 See Ogata, -World Order', 3.
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 Ogata, 'World Order', 4: 'Referring to the situation in Northern Iraq in 1991 . . . UNHCR
was given the task to protect, assist and reintegrate the Kurds . . . in a less than full)' secure
environment and with 500 UN Guards monitoring their fate.'
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 A concept not much in evidence in the High Commissioner's lecture at the IISS: 'Peace,
Security and Humanitarian Action'. Cf. Morris, 'Humanitarian Aid and Neutrality*.
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organization shall not necessarily be considered the act of a State in the
territory or under the jurisdiction of which it takes place.176 However,
article 9 establishes, under the rubric, 'Attribution to the State of the
conduct of organs placed at its disposal by another State or by an
international organization', that:
The conduct of an organ which has been placed at the disposal of a State by
another State or by an international organization shall be considered as an act
of the former State under international law, if that organ was acting in the
exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the State at whose disposal
it has been placed.
Since UNHCR will be acting with the consent of the host State in most
cases, then its acts will leave the host State responsible as long as it was
'acting in die exercise of elements of die governmental audiority' of diat
State.
The two senses of responsibility, 'responsibility for' and 'responsibility
to', run parallel in diis analysis; however, UNHCR still remains largely
unaccountable in practice.
3.3.1 Responsibility towards individuals under UNHCR protection
If UNHCR now operates in States where diere is no functioning
government, tiien how far should it assume responsibility for die 'safety
and well-being of civilian populations'?177 Under paragraph 1 of die
Statute, the High Commissioner shall provide international protection to
refugees within the scope of the Statute (paragraphs 6, 7 and 9), and diis
is to be achieved, (1) by promoting die conclusion and ratification of
international conventions and supervising their application; (2) mrough
special agreements with Governments to improve die situation of refugees;
and, (3) promoting die admission of refugees to the territories of States.178
If UNHCR fails to fulfil its mandate, should it be responsible in
international law to those individuals within its protection for mandate
breaches which give rise to a violation of human rights standards? And,
if so, what, if any, should be die consequences? Inter-governmental
organizations (IGOs) do not generally ratify international human rights
treaties, and notiiing in general international law imposes duties under
international human rights treaties on non-State actors; at most, UN
agencies are bound to uphold diose parts of international human rights
and humanitarian law which are customary and where custom lays down
176
 Above, note 20.
177
 'UNHCR 2000', above, note 11, at para. 38. See also, W. Clarance, 'Field Strategy', 230:
'[There] is the need of the post-Cold War environment, with an increasing number of sensitive
situations relating to conflict, either before, during or after, where large groups of persons are at risk
and the only politically acceptable source for the protection they require is the international
community.'
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that the agency should be bound. United Nations subsidiary organs may
have to uphold the human rights standards established in resolutions if
those resolutions are treated as internal law, but diey are not obliged by
reason of the Convention itself. On the odier hand, article 20 of the UN
Convention on the Safety of Personnel provides that,179
Nothing in this Convention shall affect: (a) The applicability of international
humanitarian law and universally recognized standards of human rights as
contained in international instruments in relation to the protection of United
Nations operations and United Nations and associated personnel or the responsibility
of such personnel to respect such law and standards, (emphasis added)
Even if article 20 reflects international law, because UNHCR and similar
relief organizations operate in periods of crisis, the standards would be
tiiose applicable where a State had derogated. However, die right to life
and die right to be free from torture and inhuman and degrading
treatment are always non-derogable, so issues surrounding repatriation
could more readily impose a high level of responsibility.180
Voluntary repatriation is widiin the UNHCR Statute,181 is addressed
in 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa,182 and is the subject of Executive Committee
Conclusions adopted in 1980, 1985 and 1994.183 A current question is
how 'voluntary' does voluntary repatriation have to be?184 'Voluntary
repatriation' suggests that the refugee is willing to return to the country
of his or her nationality. This is a subjective test, and one of UNHCR's
functions has traditionally been to establish die essentially voluntary
character of repatriation.185 UNHCR's 1996 handbook, Voluntary
Repatriation: International Protection, states (at page 10) that '[the] principle
of voluntariness is die cornerstone of international protection widi respect
179
 Above, note 142.
' The European Court of Human Rights in Cruz Vaxas v Sweden, Series A, vol.201 (1991), held
that there had to be substantial grounds for believing there was a real risk of torture, inhuman or
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 Conclusion 18 (XXXI), 1980; 40 (XXXVI), 1985; and, 70 (XLV) 1994. See also, Sub-
committee of the Whole on International Protection, 23rd Meeting, 'Information Note on die
Development of UNHCR's Guidelines on the Protection Aspects of Voluntary Repatriation', EC/
SCP/803, 3 Aug. 1993.
I am grateful to Alex Neve for his assistance in this matter. See also, Human Rights Watch,
TJncertain Refuge. A HRW Short Report', vol.9:1, Apr. 1997.
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 EXCOM Conclusion 18 (XXXI) 1980, paras.(b) and (c). See also, 40 (XXXVI) 1985: '(b) The
repatriation of refugees should only take place at their jmfy exfnssed wish; the voluntary and individual
character of repatriation of refugees and the need for it to be carried out under conditions of absolute
safttf, preferably to the place of residence of the refugee in his country of origin, should always be
respected.' (emphasis added)
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to the return of refugees.'186 To that end, refugees are to be provided
with opportunities to view conditions in their State of origin prior to
returning.187 Furthermore, if a refugee population decides to return
spontaneously of its own volition, UNHCR has a responsibility to 'provide
timely and effective protection and assistance, to the extent possible, in
the country of origin',188 and after return, it is part of UNHCR's mandate
to monitor the situation of the former refugees.189
On the other hand, in appropriate circumstances, UNHCR should
promote voluntary repatriation as the best solution to a refugee crisis.190
In a perfect world, protection would be offered until conditions were
such that the refugee population all wished voluntarily to return to their
country of nationality; unfortunately, as has been noted above, host States
may find the presence of the refugee population is a destabilizing burden.
That places competing pressures on UNHCR: to ensure that the refugees
truly wish to return and yet, simultaneously, to decide when repatriation
will be safe and then to promote it. Thus, it is possible that 'voluntary'
will be read as 'safe', an objective test, where individuals may be told
that they must return.191 Indeed, protection and voluntary repatriation
require a differentiated and dual response from UNHCR. What should
be beyond question is that voluntary repatriation should never amount
to refotdement. The problem arises where conditions in the host country
are such as to engender spontaneous return as the preferable alternative,
even before conditions in the country of origin are suitable.
186
 Cf. Takahashi, S., The UNHCR Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: The Emphasis of
Return over Protection', 9 1JRL 593 (1997).
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'Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the
International Labour Organization to examine the Observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour
Convention', 1930 (No. 29), 20 Aug. 1998; available at http://www.Uo.org/
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UNHCR's role is to pnmwte, not aucule voluntary repatriation.
192
 A similar dual response is recognized by the ICRC in situations involving internally displaced
persons; Lavoyer, 'Refugees and IDPs', 174.
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Sometimes, however, repatriation takes place under duress.193 In those
circumstances, UNHCR's role is to provide protection from Ttfoulement
and, at the same time, ensure the safest possible conditions for those
having to return.194 It is in a no-win situation, but its overall responsibility
to refugees implies that it should do all in its power to avoid participating
in repatriation under duress; like the ICRC, it should be more willing to
condemn too hasty repatriations.195 The 1996 Great Lakes Crisis raises
many questions about UNHCR's dual role of protection and
repatriation.196 It is generally accepted that the vast majority of Hutus
who fled Rwanda in 1994 were prevented from returning by members
of the previous government in die camps through intimidation and
misinformation.197 UNHCR could not run the camps as it desired. In
such circumstances, it is debatable whether it should have with-
drawn;198 some would argue that the organization's presence ensured, for
as long as possible, the survival of the refugees/hostages, but the contrary
argument is that several other UN agencies can provide relief and they
do not risk losing their reputation and mandate for protection.199 In a
similar situation in Thailand in the 1980s, UNHCR left the running of
the camps close to the Kampuchean border in the hands of the United
Nations Border Relief Organization.200 Even a hostage population
deserved the internationally accepted guarantees against refoulement, no
less did the almost one million refugees in Tanzania who, with the consent
of UNHCR, were told by the government that they had to return
by the end of 1996.20' With UNHCR workers prevented from exercising
any protection, the Tanzanian army forced the refugees back into
Rwanda,202 even as returning Hutus were being killed there and in
Burundi.203 While the former Zaire was beyond the control of UNHCR,
and UNHCR deserves sympathy for not receiving the proper support
193
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 Cf. Mooncy, 'Presence, ergo protection?', 411, note 15, and accompanying text
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196
 See the Amnesty International Reports, 'Great Lakes' and 'Rwanda'.
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32-H): EC/46/SC/CRP.11, 4Jan. 1996; Guardian, 12 Apr. 1997, 19.
198
 U N H C R closed the Atroujh c a m p in Nor the rn I raq because it alleged it could not run it as
it wished; Guardian, 2 Apr. 1997, 8. It seems to have learned its lesson in Albania, where people
fleeing Kosovo have not been put in camps, bu t are housed with die local populat ion, lest die camps
are abused by the Kosovo Liberation Army: Guardian, 17 J u n . 1998, 14.
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630 , 6 3 2 - 3 . See the report of Kofi Annan : Guardian, 17 Apr . 1998, 16.
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17 Dec. 1996, Tanzania — Government and UNHCR must respect international law1, Guardian,
14 Dec 1996, 17.
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 See also Guardian, 5 May 1997, 11; 6 May 1997, 9, on the deaUis of refugees returning in
inappropriate conditions to Rwanda from the former Zaire for fear of die Kabila forces.
** Guardian, 24Jan. 1997, 14; 13Jan. 1997, 10, respectively.
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of the international community,204 Tanzania calls into question the
moral authority and the legal responsibility of the organization. To
agree a date on paper for the return of all refugees in camps without
expressly agreeing proper safeguards appears to condone the appearance
of refoidement, in the absence of screening procedures, it cannot be
doubted that some persons deserving of protection were sent back.205
That the return was the work of the Tanzanian government does not
absolve UNHCR of its responsibility to protect.206
3.3.2 Responsibility towards host States
UNHCR might find it easier to obtain protection within States if it were
not perceived as viewing camps as a permanent solution. Under the Statute
and the 1951 Convention,207 refugee status, and dierefore presumably any
entitlement to UNHCR protection, ends when the circumstances giving
rise to its acquisition have ceased to exist.208 Thus, in that sense, all
protection of refugees is temporary, for once there is no longer any fear
of persecution in the refugee-generating State, the host State may return
the former refugees. In practice, UNHCR must seek to maintain a
balance between protection and repatriation,209 but not to balance
protection against the interests of the host State.
Another aspect of its responsibility towards States concerns UNHCR's
activities within the territory.210 UNHCR and its personnel have immunity
from proceedings arising out of their official activities, and a UNHCR
worker who drove a car negligently and caused an accident could claim
See Sandoz 's fourth conclusion, T h e right to intervene on humani ta r ian grounds ' : ' O n c e the
Security Council or regional bodies have decided to take action, all requisite means should be
deployed or kept in reserve to make sure that the operat ion succeeds, whatever the circumstances.
Wha t , for instance, are the alternatives if the operation is obstructed or if those conduct ing it come
under attack? If those eventualities are not seriously taken into account at the outset, if those
launching the operat ion are not absolutely determined to ensure its success a n d to use all necessary
means to that end, the credibility of the decision-makers a n d the security of those involved in
implementing the operat ion will be seriously jeopardized. '
Apparently, the Tanzan i ans undertook that those who chose not to re turn would be screened,
but they failed to honour diis.
206
 T h e situation can be distinguished from that in Abkhazia, where U N H C R temporarily
withdrew because it appeared that the Abkhazis a n d the Russians were prevent ing repatriation
contrary to the Quadr ipar t i t e Agreement ; Mooney, ' Internal Displacement ' , 211—12.
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 UNHCR Statute, para. 6A(u"Xe); art. 1C(5), CSR31.
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 See also EXCOM Conclusion 69 (XLIII) 1992, and 'UNHCR 2000', above, note 11, at para.
23.
See ICRC's condemnations, Lavoycr, 'Refugees and IDPs', 170, note 29. Voluntary repatriation
must only apply to those where the conditions giving rise to refugee status still persist, for the
cessation clauses indicate diat there can be no problem with returning someone who formerly had
refugee status, but who is no longer a refugee because the circumstances giving rise thereto have
ceased to exist.
If die Reparations Case established that the United Nations has international personality to bring
a claim where one of its employees is injured in the course of his or her duties, the corollary is that
a claim may also be made against the UN.
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immunity in appropriate circumstances.2" However, all relief agencies
need to show respect to the host State and not behave as though State
sovereignty no longer has any relevance.212
The impact of placing a camp, usually in a rural area taking up land
that could be cultivated, does little to promote good relations with the
local population. Moreover, it is uncertain how far UNHCR might be
responsible with regard to the conduct of refugees in camps, or generally
in the country of refuge. A more interesting question concerns UNHCR's
liability for policies which leave the host State responsible for a violation
of international law, for example, where it fails to prevent camps from
being used as a base for attacks on the country of origin,213 or if UNHCR
incorrectly declares that a source State is safe for return, closes a camp
and permits or facilitates the repatriation of the refugee population who
suffer persecution on return. There is no obvious mechanism by which
UNHCR might be held accountable, aldiough a State might defend itself
before the Human Rights Committee or other supervisory organ, and
argue that any breach of its human rights obligations was due to UNHCR.
3.3.3 Responsibility of and towards other IGOs and NGOs
Right from the beginning, it was envisaged diat UNHCR would act in
co-operation with other IGOs and NGOs. The Statute provides that
UNHCR shall 'facilitate the co-ordination of private organizations
concerned with the welfare of refugees', and distribute funds for the
assistance of refugees to diose private and public bodies 'best qualified
to administer such assistance'.2 The Model Agreement calls in article
IY.3 for local offices to establish and maintain links with NGOs.215
211
 Speeding to reach a situation where emergency protection was required would be treated
differently from drunkenness, for instance.
Sandoz, The right to intervene on humanitarian grounds' makes a related point; 'But the
governments of poor States further weakened by war may well also legitimately fear a disorderly
arrival en masse of humanitarian organizations which are frequently ignorant of the practical and
logistic constraints inherent in the situation and have little understanding of the political, social and
cultural context Humanitarian organizations therefore have a duty to share their experiences and
to adhere to certain working principles designed to minimize the destabilizing effect that their work
can have, not only on the governments involved, but also on the social fabric of the communities
they are trying to help.'
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 Ordinarily, the host State would be responsible; see United Nations 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the UN, UNGA Res.2625 (XXV). See also, EXCOM Conclusion
No.48 (XXXVIII), 1987, para. 4<b).
214
 Statute, above, note 28, at paras. 8(i) and 10.
115
 See S.C. DeWolf, "Practical Aspects of UNHCR-NGO Partnership', paper for the PARinAC
Conference in Addis Ababa, March 1994. Morris, 'Protection Dilemmas', 497, suggests that one
necessary development is for UNHCR to be prepared to explain its practice in any particular
situation to other agencies, a naicent duty to inform on a much wider scale: ibid., 497-8.
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UNHCR has also improved inter-agency co-operation with other United
Nations bodies, such as WFP and UNICEF.216
However, limited funds are available for relief work and the different
agencies and organizations are, to a certain extent, 'fighting for the same
pot'.217 Relief agencies and NGOs, therefore, need to promote their own
humanitarian works in order to keep their name in the public eye,218 and
this does not readily foster inter-organizational co-operation. Donor States
increasingly see IGOs and NGOs as the most reliable means of ensuring
that funding reaches the population,219 and are more likely to channel
relief that way.
UNHCR is in regular, close co-operation with the ICRC.220 In situations
of armed conflict, both UNHCR and the ICRC have responsibilities
toward refugees. ICRC's role is to uphold international humanitarian
law, and to protect all civilians, including refugees, but where conflict
has ceased it takes on a subsidiary role.221
The final aspect of UNHCR's relationship with other IGOs and NGOs
is that it ought not to try to do everything.222 To 'solve' a refugee crisis,
the conditions in the source State must have sufficiently improved for
repatriation to be, at minimum, safe. The social infrastructure in the
State will often need to be rebuilt,223 but this is not UNHCR's job; in
Europe, that task is increasingly falling to the OSCE,224 while there and
elsewhere it should be for UNDP and other agencies. UNHCR has a
vested interest in the restoration, for example, of the rule of law, but it
216
 See ' U N H C R 2000', above, note 11, at para. 73; see generally, Hathaway and Neve, T o w a r d s
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C N . 4 / 1 9 9 7 / N G O / 8 4 , 26 March 1997); and Clarance, 'Field Strategy3, 246ff, 249, on U N H C R -
H C H R co-operation in Rwanda in the wake of the genocide.
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the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement : Lavoyer, 176f.
221
 ' T h e arrival of U N H C R and die negotiation of a cease-fire in the Croat ian conflict in J a n u a r y
1992, led the I C R C gradually to phase out its relief p r o g r a m m e and transfer responsibility for
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is not best positioned to give effect to it, or otherwise to bestow international
peace and security all round. UNHCR has perhaps the greatest field
experience in carrying out operations in acute crisis of any United Nations
agency,225 but any co-ordinating role must be based on additional resources
and a context in which other agencies can develop tfieir own expertise.226
3.3.4 UNHCRS responsibility to withdraw from situations where there are
violations of human rights
Many conflicts today are of an inter-ethnic nature, with displacement of
others being the goal. In evacuating refugees from an area where they
might be in danger, UNHCR may well assist with the illegal aims of one
of the warring parties.227 UNHCR and the ICRC treat evacuation as a
measure of last resort, and UNHCR suspended its operation to return
displaced persons in Abkhazia because, despite the Quadripartite
Agreement, the ethnic cleansing continued.228 The situation is not simple,
diough;229 Should one leave people to dieir fate lest to assist in an
evacuation is to collude in edinic cleansing?230 In die final analysis,
however, humanitarian aid is cheap and saves the international community
from having to commit the resources to resolve a conflict; UNHCR can
hardly be blamed where it is used as a 'sticking-plaster' and has to resort
to unconventional methods to avoid worse disasters.231 Nevertheless,
withdrawal is an option, and an essential alternative to participation, even
by presence, in human rights violations.
So far, the focus has been on attributing responsibility to UNHCR as
a consequence of its increased role and die powers and rights diat should
flow therefrom. However, most humanitarian crises are now multi-agency
operations, often including military forces, in which die attribution of
responsibility is necessarily complex. States are responsible generally
for harm that arises from an internationally wrongful act on dieir
territory,232 and, where UNHCR is lead agency or is running a camp,
the position appears superficially similar. UNHCR, however, lacks die
225
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 See generally Sue Lautze, Bruce Jones & Mark Duffield, 'Strategic Humanitarian Co-ordination
in the Great Lakes Region, 1996—1997: An Independent Assessment', Policy, Information and
Advocacy Division, Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, New
York, March 1998, paras. 162-77, 174 (available on ReliefWeb: http://wwwnotes.reUefWeb.tnt
and on OCHA-Online: http7/156.106.192.130/dha_ol/).
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8, 5 Apr. 1993.
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totality of State powers, so that extending the analogy of State responsibility
is hardly appropriate. Moreover, UNHCR could hardly be liable for the
consequences of international inaction, such as the Security Council's
failure to send adequate troops to keep the peace in the safe areas in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.233
3.3.5 Responsibility towards the International Community with respect to the non-
protection of war criminals
Events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda have given rise to another
particular issue, namely, responsibility to assist the international
community in punishing those guilty of the horrendous crimes that
occurred in those conflicts. This may seem self-evident, since the definition
of a refugee in both the 1951 Convention and the Statute excludes those
who have committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime
against humanity or any other serious, non-political crime.234 In practice,
it is impossible for unarmed UNHCR staff effectively to screen out well-
armed militia in the camps, and even UNAMIR was unable to prevent
intimidation.235 When refugees were eventually forcibly returned to
Rwanda, many were arrested as genocide suspects,236 and while war
criminals do not deserve refugee status, their human rights should not
be ignored; on return, effective mechanisms to ensure non-persecution
and fair trial need to be in place.
A further issue is even more complex. UNHCR staff in the camps may
well have evidence concerning those accused of war crimes. Should they
be obliged to testify?237 Strict. neutrality in the face of war criminals
creates a dilemma for humanitarian organizations. There are, however,
233
 Landgren, 'Safety Zones', 445, and Mooney, 'Presence, ergo protection?', 419 on UNHCR
and ICRC having to compensate for UNPROFOR's failures.
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competing interests. On the one hand, the international community has
established international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
in order that serious violators do not escape punishment.238 On the other
hand, UNHCR needs to consider its future access to war zones to protect
victims of war, as well as the safety of its staff in camps; indeed, while
former staff from the camps could not be directly prevented from giving
evidence, it might be that UNHCR could claim privilege for the greater
good of its continued access to war zones.239 The Rules of Evidence of the
Rwanda Tribunal might provide a means of satisfying both international
community and UNHCR needs.240 While Rule 70 of the Rwanda Rules
permits UNHCR to give confidential evidence to the prosecutor in order
that further evidence for use at trial might be discovered, Rule 75 is the
only means by which a court might preserve the anonymity of a witness,
even from the accused. Under the Yugoslav Rules,241 Rule 70 goes further
238
 The Statute of Yugoslav Tribunal was presented to the Security Council in 'The Report of
the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)': 32 ILM
1159 (1993). The Statute was adopted by the Security Council in Resolution 827 (1993): 32 ILM
1192 (1993) The Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereinafter, Rules) are now at Revision 6 —
IT/32/Rev.6. The Rwanda Tribunal was established under UNSC res. 935 and 955 (1994), reprinted
in 5 CrhruLF 695 (1994). See also the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 37 ILM
999 (1998).
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 Rules ofProcedure and Evidence, UN doc rTR/3/REV.l (1995), entered into force 29 June
1995: 'Rule 69 Protection of Victims and Witntssa . . . (C) Subject to Rule 75, the identity of the victim
or witness shall be disclosed in sufficient time prior to the trial to allow adequate time for preparation
of the defence. Rule 70 Matters not Subject to Disclosure . . . (B) If the Prosecutor is in possession of
information which has been provided to him on a confidential basis and which has been used solely
for the purpose of generating new evidence, that initial information and its origin shall not be
disclosed by the Prosecutor without the consent of the person or entity providing the initial information
and shall in any event not be given in evidence without prior disclosure to the accused . . . Rule 75
Measures for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses (A) A Judge or a Chamber may, proprio motu or at the
request of either party, or of the victim or witness concerned, . . . , order appropriate measures for
the privacy and protection of victims and witnesses, provided that the measures are consistent with
the rights of the accused. (B) A Chamber may hold an in camera proceeding to determine whether
to order (i) measures to prevent disclosure to the public or the media of the identity or whereabouts
of a victim or a witness, or of persons related to or associated with him by such means as: (a)
expunging names and identifying information from the Chamber's public records; (b) non-disclosure
to the public of any records identifying the victim; (c) giving of testimony through image- or voice-
altering devices or closed circuit television; and (d) assignment of a pseudonym; (ii) closed sessions,
in accordance with Rule 79.'
"' Above, note 238. 'Rule 70 Matters not Subject to Disdosurt... (C) If, after obtaining the consent
of the person or entity providing information under this Rule, the Prosecutor elects to present as
evidence any testimony, document or other material so provided, the Trial Chamber, notwithstanding
Rule 98, may not order cither party to produce additional evidence received from the person or
entity providing the initial information, nor may the Trial Chamber for the purpose of obtaining
such additional evidence itself summon that person or a representative of that entity as a witness or
order their attendance. (D) If the Prosecutor calls as a witness the person providing, or a representative
of die entity providing, information under this Rule, the Trial Chamber may not compel the witness
to answer any question the witness declines to answer on grounds of confidentiality. (E) The right
of the accused to challenge die evidence presented by the Prosecution shall remain unaffected subject
only to limitations contained in Sub-rules (C) and (D).
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and restricts the right of the Trial Chamber to demand that witnesses
from, for example, UNHCR give additional information over and above
that to which they have agreed. Even here, though, there is no limit on
the accused's right to challenge this evidence, subject to the limits on the
Trial Chamber itself. The accused has a right to a fair trial and if the
prosecutor is aware of evidence (as opposed to confidential information)
beneficial to the accused, no matter what the source, it must be disclosed
under Rule 68. Whether the Tribunal would listen to arguments about
institutional privilege and the need to preserve the organization's access
to war zones in the future where the accused's rights are at stake is not
so clear.242
4. Conclusion
The relationship between States and IGOs is in a state of flux, as is the
position of IGOs in international society generally. A new compact is
necessary between the UN and its agencies and States as to responsibilities
for humanitarian crises.243 One way forward, so that international
humanitarian relief agencies and those diey protect and assist know where
they stand, would be to draft a convention encompassing die major
human rights commitments, to be open for signature by IGOs and other
relief organizations, thereby clarifying the scope of commitment beyond
their own specific and original mandates. The opening clause of the
preamble to the 1951 Convention recalls that 'the Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . have affirmed
the principle diat human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and
freedoms widiout discrimination . . . ' Thus, die idea that refugees deserve
die traditional human rights in addition to die rights established in die
1951 Convention is not open to dispute. It is not doubted diat UNHCR
in providing protection and administering relief to refugees already
operates witiiin a human rights framework, but it should be an express
commitment, reflecting die more autonomous role which UNHCR now
has. Given diat conflict situations already attract human rights monitors
and even country rapporteurs, diere would be no shortage of material
by which one could evaluate UNHCR's performance244 and diat of States
Rule 70 applies to evidence for the Prosecution. Furthermore, given the fact that humanitarian
organizations regularty employ people on short-term contracts for the duration of crises, it may be
that any privilege based on institutional needs for the future would not be available in the case of
evidence they had obtained during their employment.
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in relation to their responsibilities to refugees.245 Properly established
checks on practice improve performance and prevent unofficial, ill-
prepared analyses based on hearsay and die reporting organization's own
agenda.246 However, it may be much easier to impose these extra
responsibilities on UNHCR than it would be to ensure that UNHCR
also enjoys die necessary additional rights set out above.
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